Director General of Anti-Profiteering v. Laureate Buildwell Pvt. Ltd.

01 · Facts of the case and issues

The complaint by Manoj Kumar Pawa concerned construction services in Parx Laureate, Noida. DGAP’s original report dated 16 December 2024 used 6.48% pre-GST and 16.91% post-GST credit-to-purchase ratios and proposed Rs. 25,52,40,017 gross profiteering. Its individual-shortfall table showed Rs. 5,95,56,344 despite larger aggregate benefit claimed. Those historical figures were superseded after GSTAT’s 7 May 2026 Rule 133(4) remand.

The supplementary report dated 21 July 2026 changed the post-GST ratio to 15.97%, leaving a 9.49 percentage-point increment. It recorded Rs. 30,33,47,850 savings, deducted Rs. 20,02,23,000 cost escalation and arrived at Rs. 10,31,24,850 net savings. Allocation at the displayed Rs. 41.19 per square foot produced Rs. 6,89,32,593 base benefit plus Rs. 82,71,911 GST, totaling Rs. 7,72,04,504. These are the revised report figures accepted on this record, not a general legal entitlement to deduct every cost increase.

The computation tables run from 1 July 2017 to 31 March 2024. Paragraph 15’s penalty discussion instead says the contravention extends to 31 October 2020. The inconsistency is left visible rather than selecting a harmonised period.

Source: Original report/tables: paragraphs 1–3, physical pp. 3–5. Party positions and remand: paragraphs 5–9, pp. 5–8. Revised tables: paragraph 10, pp. 8–12. Conflicting penalty period: paragraph 15, p. 14.

02 · Discussion and reasoning of the Hon’ble Court

GSTAT accepted the revised principal report and examined the evidence of substantial pass-through. Invoices and receipts recorded a 7% discount identified under Section 171(1); the source records Rs. 43,71,38,175 passed on in aggregate to 428 residential and 31 commercial unit-buyers. Nevertheless, the revised table left Rs. 10,47,053 shortfall for 22 buyers, Rs. 3,68,693 for two, and Rs. 78,876 for the applicant. Those components correctly total Rs. 14,94,622 for 25 recipients. Excess amounts recorded for others did not erase these individual deficits.

Interest was contested. The developer sought waiver where it had waived buyers’ delayed-consideration interest, matching rates where buyers paid interest, and later starts based on final payment or completion/occupancy. The Tribunal rejected those submissions. Although paragraph 14 quotes Rule 133(3)(b) in collection-to-return terms, its own reasoning and paragraphs 17 and 21 expressly start interest on 1 July 2017. The note preserves that operative start without substituting a buyer’s collection date.

The Tribunal decided the two requested adjustments differently. For Abha Mayawala’s Flat 4043, Tower Delonix, it accepted reduction of the final settlement/payment by the ITC benefit plus 18% interest calculated from 1 July 2017. For Manoj Kumar Pawa’s Flat 7081, Tower Nectarine, it rejected the proposed consideration offset because the monetary dispute was before the consumer forum, directing the entire unpaid ITC benefit with stipulated interest. This is neither a blanket permission for adjustments nor a blanket prohibition.

Source: Principal and invoice findings: paragraphs 11–13, physical pp. 12–13; revised Table C, p. 11. Interest reasons and rejected submissions: paragraphs 14, 16–17, pp. 13–17. Distinct buyer directions: paragraphs 18–19, pp. 17–18.

03 · Judicial decision and operative relief

GSTAT accepted the 21 July 2026 report and held that Rs. 14,94,622 must be passed to 25 eligible recipients. It ordered recipient interest under Rule 133(3)(b), read with the 18% rate in the reasoning, expressly effective from 1 July 2017. The two buyer-specific directions remain part of the disposition. Closing the matter in paragraph 24 is the conclusion of substantive liability and contested-remedy adjudication, not a finding that payment was completed.

Penalty is qualified. Paragraph 15 limits Section 171(3A) to profiteering attributable to the period from 1 January 2020, whereas paragraph 17 more broadly describes 10% of the amount due to remaining buyers. Paragraph 22 makes liability subject to the proviso. No certified penalty on the whole Rs. 14,94,622 is computed here. The quoted proviso says thirty days from passing of the order, even though paragraph 17 also uses within a month; the two phrases are not treated as invariably identical. The conclusion fixes no separate principal-refund deadline. No payment or satisfied penalty-waiver condition is verified.

Other source defects remain qualified: paragraph 11 dates a clarification 23 December 2026, after judgment, while paragraph 6 says 23 December 2025; the earlier shortfall appears as Rs. 5,59,56,344 in paragraph 3 versus Rs. 5,95,56,344 in the original table. Revised Table C prints a negative excess-benefit difference of Rs. 36,14,28,293, inconsistent with that row’s displayed subtraction. No corrected allocation is invented. Paragraph 17 mislabels Section 171(3A) as a provision of the Rules; it is a provision of the Act.

Source: Operative conclusion: paragraphs 20–24, physical pp. 18–19. Interest/penalty and adjustments: paragraphs 14–19, pp. 13–18. Source discrepancies: paragraph 3, p. 4; paragraph 6, p. 7; Table C, p. 11; paragraph 11, p. 12; paragraph 17, p. 17.

04 · In favour of

Final substantive recipient-liability determination with independent resolution of interest, penalty and individual adjustment disputes. The accepted aggregate pass-through and revised principal do not extinguish the 25 individual shortfalls. No completed-compliance or general netting rule is established.

Source: Paragraphs 11–24, physical pp. 12–19.